Espionage Alert

Austrian Armed Forces: Who Recognizes These Suspicious Russians?

Do you know any of the Russian “diplomats” being sought?(Bild: BMLV)

“If any of these individuals have contacted you, please report it”: In an urgent email to all soldiers, the Ministry of Defense in Vienna is seeking information on 21 suspected Russian agents who are alleged to have been spying while posing as diplomats. 

Just a few days after the names—and in some cases photos—of 21 suspected Russian spies appeared in the German media, the Austrian Armed Forces are now also searching for these men: “If you are familiar with one or more of these individuals or if they have contacted you, you are requested to report this to the Defense Intelligence Agency via the Espionage Reporting Office as part of counterintelligence efforts,” the message stated.

There are fears that the Russians specifically sought contact with individuals in the Austrian Armed Forces in order to obtain information. 

The individuals being sought are as follows: 

Do you know any of the 21 Russian “diplomats” being sought?(Bild: BMLV)

The names and photos of these individuals come from the Rupep.org database of the Russian opposition media outlet “Agentstvo”; Austrian intelligence services consider the information to be credible. 

The German newspaper “Bild” translated the names and positions of those sought from the opposition platform as follows:

The list of individuals being sought

Staff at the Russian Embassy in Vienna:

• Yevgeny Ambrosij (Advisor): Reportedly has ties to the SWR. Reason: Residential address in a Moscow building whose apartments, according to research, are predominantly attributed to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SWR).
• Alexander Solobov (Attaché): Reportedly has ties to the SWR. Reason: Receives income from the SWR Academy.
• Alexander Palojan (Attaché): Reportedly has ties to the SWR. Reason: Salary from SWR Unit 33949.
• Dmitri Fedorov (Attaché): Reportedly has ties to the SWR. Reason: His wife worked at a kindergarten under the SWR’s jurisdiction. He also has a residential address in a building with ties to the GRU.
• Alexander Golovashkin (First Secretary): Reportedly has ties to the GRU. Reason: Father was a GRU employee; residential address in a GRU housing complex; also a member of a military unit affiliated with the GRU.
• Alexei Fokin (Military Attaché): Reportedly has ties to the GRU. Reason: Used a known GRU address and is registered with the “Senesch” special unit.
• Stanislaw Alexandridi (Attaché): Reportedly has ties to the GRU. Reason: According to research, he used the address of the GRU headquarters in Moscow.
• Dmitri Kramarev (Attaché): Reportedly has ties to the FSB. Reason: Previously worked at the “Atlas” research center, which is subordinate to the FSB.

Russian staff members at the OSCE in Vienna:

• Anton Momatiuk (Advisor): Possible connection to the GRU. Reason: Residential address in a known GRU housing complex and use of the address of a military academy.
• Vitali Koslov (Advisor): Possible connection to the GRU. Reason: Use of the address of the GRU University.
• Sergei Kildyashov (First Secretary): Possible connection to the GRU. Reason: Registrations at Ministry of Defense facilities and known GRU addresses.
• Alexei Silantjev (Second Secretary): Possible connection to the GRU. Rationale: Use of the same addresses as Kildjaschow, including the GRU University.
• Vladimir Kravchenko (First Secretary): Possible connection to the military and security apparatus. Rationale: Previous employment at the Russian Ministry of Defense’s 4th Research Center.
• Sergei Ryshkov (Delegate for Arms Control): Possible connection to the military and security apparatus. Reason: Service in Unit 22280 and use of addresses belonging to the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense.
• Ruslan Shishin (Delegate): Possible ties to the military and security apparatus. Reason: Use of addresses belonging to the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, and a military academy.

IAEA staff member in Vienna:

• Igor Kholodnikov (Advisor): Possible connection to the GRU. Reason: His wife listed the address of GRU headquarters as her home address.
• Sergei Berezyn (First Secretary): Suspected connection to the GRU. Reason: Registered at the premises of a GRU special communications unit.
• Grigory Krivenko (Second Secretary): Suspected connection to the GRU. Reason: His wife used the address of the GRU University; he also received income from a military unit involved in nuclear activities.

Suspected agents at the United Nations:

• Artem Ratzko (UN advisor): Possible connection to the GRU. Reason: Resided in a house with other GRU employees, used the address of the General Staff, and previously worked for an FSO unit.
• Alexander Zajarnyj (UNIDO advisor): Possible connection to the GRU. Reason: Use of the GRU University’s address.

Vienna has long been considered the world capital of spies due to its geographical location, virtually in the center of Europe. The unusually bloated staff at the Russian embassy—as well as at other embassies—suggests a correspondingly high number of agents.

In the Russian mission in Vienna’s third district alone, a three-digit number of Moscow’s operatives are said to be spying on our country. The intelligence agents’ goal: to gather information on politicians, corporate executives, and critics of Russia and send it to the Kremlin.

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